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FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
Because of the long latency period of asbestos disease, 
debtor companies in asbestos-related bankruptcies face a large 
5 
 
and uncertain pool of future claimants.1  This raises two related 
problems: first, debtor companies may not be able to emerge 
from bankruptcy without a true sense of their future liabilities; 
and second, if these companies cannot emerge from 
bankruptcy, future claimants may not have access to redress 
for asbestos-related harm.2  Section 524(g) of the Bankruptcy 
Code attempts to solve both of these problems.  It enables 
bankruptcy courts to establish a trust for future claimants as 
part of a debtor company’s reorganization plan, and, through 
the resulting channeling injunction, diverts all claims against 
the debtor to the trust.3  This ensures both that future claimants 
are assured restitution, and that debtor companies can survive 
bankruptcy without the threat of future asbestos suits.4 
   
Largely in order to encourage contributions to the trust, 
certain third parties may also benefit from a § 524(g) 
 
1 See In re W.R. Grace & Co., 729 F.3d 311, 323 (3d Cir. 2013); 
H.R. Rep. No. 103-835, at 40 (1994) (“Asbestos-related 
disease has a long latency period—up to 30 years or more—
and many of the exposures from the 1940’s, when asbestos was 
in widespread use as an insulating material, [became] the 
personal injury lawsuits of the 1970’s and 1980’s.”).  
 
2 See H.R. Rep. No. 103-835, at 40-41. 
 
3 Id.  
 
4 See Grace, 729 F.3d at 315; In re Combustion Eng’g Inc., 391 
F.3d 190, 234 (3d Cir. 2004); In re Plant Insulation Co., 734 
F.3d 900, 906 (9th Cir. 2013); In re Quigley Co., Inc., 676 F.3d 




channeling injunction.5  However, these protections do not 
extend to all claims brought against third parties.  In order to 
conform with the statute, (1) these claims must be “directed 
against a third party who is identifiable from the terms of such 
injunction” and (2) the third party must be “alleged to be 
directly or indirectly liable for the conduct of, claims against, 
or demands on the debtor”; in addition, (3) “such alleged 
liability” must arise “by reason of” one of four statutory 
relationships, including, as is relevant here, “the third party’s 
provision of insurance to the debtor or a related party.”6  These 
requirements strike a balance between providing contributing 
third parties freedom from “continued exposure to indirect 
asbestos claims,” and “ensur[ing] fairness” for future 
claimants.7  
 
Only the second and third requirements, referred to as 
the “derivative liability” and “statutory relationship” 
requirements, respectively, are at issue in this case.  In In re 
W.R. Grace & Co. (“Grace I”),8 we instructed the Bankruptcy 
Court on the appropriate analysis for determining whether 
these requirements were met.  Because we conclude that the 
Bankruptcy Court misapplied our guidance, we vacate the 
decision below.  We hold that the claims at issue meet the 
 
5 Quigley, 676 F.3d at 59; see Grace, 729 F.3d at 325. 
 
6 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(A)(ii). 
 
7 In re W.R. Grace & Co., 900 F.3d 126, 130-31 (3d Cir. 2018) 






derivative liability requirement, but that we cannot, on the 
record before us, determine whether they meet the statutory 
relationship requirement.  Accordingly, we again remand to the 
Bankruptcy Court for the limited purpose of developing the 
record on this point so that it can determine in the first instance 
whether the required statutory relationship exists here.  This 




This case stems from the confirmed Chapter 11 
bankruptcy plan of W.R. Grace & Co. (“Grace”).  Grace’s 
troubles have been well-documented in the Federal Reporters,9 
so we will only recite the facts necessary for the resolution of 
this appeal.   
 
Grace operated an asbestos mining and processing 
facility in Libby, Montana from 1963 until 1990.  Faced with 
thousands of asbestos-related suits, Grace filed for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy.  When it emerged, its reorganization plan provided 
for a several-billion-dollar asbestos personal-injury trust to 
compensate existing and future claimants.  Pursuant to 
§ 524(g)(4), all asbestos-related personal injury claims against 
Grace were to be enjoined and channelled through the trust (the 
“Grace Injunction”).   
 
9 See id. at 131-32; Grace, 729 F.3d at 335-39; In re W.R. 
Grace & Co., 532 F. App’x 264, 265-66 (3d Cir. 2013); In re 
W.R. Grace & Co., 591 F.3d 164, 167-70 (3d Cir. 2009); In re 
W.R. Grace & Co., 316 F. App’x 134, 135-36 (3d Cir. 2009); 
In re W.R. Grace & Co., 115 F. App’x 565, 566-67 (3d Cir. 
2004).   
8 
 
Appellants (collectively, “CNA”) provided general 
liability, workers’ compensation, employers’ liability, and 
umbrella insurance policies to Grace at the Libby mine from 
1973 to 1996.  As part of its insurance contracts with Grace, 
CNA was granted the right to inspect the Libby operation and 
to make loss-control recommendations.  After twenty-six years 
of litigation regarding the scope of CNA’s coverage of Grace’s 
asbestos liabilities, Grace and CNA entered into a settlement 
agreement, the terms of which ensured that CNA would be 
protected by Grace’s channeling injunction.  In return, CNA 
agreed to contribute $84 million to the trust.  The terms of the 
settlement also provided that the trust would indemnify CNA 
for up to $13 million if it was held liable for certain asbestos-
related claims, including tort claims premised on CNA’s 
alleged failure to warn third parties about the mine’s dangers.   
 
Appellees (collectively, the “Montana Plaintiffs”) are a 
group of individuals who worked at the Libby mine and now 
suffer from asbestos disease.  They sued several defendants in 
Montana state court, asserting various tort claims including 
negligence against CNA (the “Montana Claims”).  The 
Montana Claims are based on allegations that CNA was aware 
of the asbestos exposure at the Libby operation and the dangers 
associated with it, and that it incurred a duty to protect and 
warn the Libby workers of these dangers when it undertook to 
provide them with “industrial hygiene services,” as well as 
when it inspected the mine.10  By failing to fulfill this duty, 
 




CNA allegedly caused the Montana Plaintiffs’ asbestos-related 
injuries.11 
 
In response to the Montana suit, CNA filed an adversary 
complaint in Bankruptcy Court seeking a declaration that the 
Montana Plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the Grace 
Injunction.  The Montana Plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss, 
and CNA filed for summary judgment.  The Bankruptcy Court 
denied the Montana Plaintiffs’ motion and granted CNA’s.12  
The Montana Plaintiffs appealed, and we affirmed in part, 
vacated in part, and remanded.  In Grace I, we concluded that 
the Grace Injunction, by its own terms, barred the Montana 
Claims.  However, we declined to decide whether these claims 
met § 524(g)’s derivative liability and statutory relationship 
requirements, in part because we had not been fully briefed on 
what law to apply.  Instead, we remanded the case back to the 
Bankruptcy Court with instructions on how to analyze these 
requirements.  On remand, the Bankruptcy Court entered 
summary judgment in favor of the Montana Plaintiffs (the 
“Bankruptcy Decision”).  CNA timely filed the instant appeal. 
  
 
11 CNA maintains that “[o]ver 1,500 similar claims have been 
asserted against CNA [and] . . . are being held in abeyance 
pending the outcome of this adversary action.”  CNA Br. at 10 
n.1. 
 
12 In re W.R. Grace & Co., No. 01-01139 (KG), 2016 WL 
6068092, *1 (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 17, 2016), aff’d in part, 






The Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334.  We have jurisdiction to review a 
direct appeal from the Bankruptcy Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 158(d)(2).13  We review the Bankruptcy Court’s grant of 
summary judgment de novo.14 
  
 
13 Of note, in Grace I, we held that the Bankruptcy Court had 
jurisdiction to enforce the injunction in this case under the 
settlement agreement’s indemnification provision.  900 F.3d at 
138-39.  Because that provision meant that the claims against 
CNA, if successful, would affect the assets of the bankruptcy 
estate, the Bankruptcy Court had “related to” jurisdiction.  Id. 
at 139.  “Related to” jurisdiction exists where “the outcome of 
[a] proceeding could conceivably have any effect on the estate 
being administered in bankruptcy.”  Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (citing Combustion Eng’g, 391 F.3d at 226).  
Specifically, “‘[r]elated to’ jurisdiction exists over actions 
against non-debtors involving contractual indemnity 
obligations between the debtor and non-debtor that 
automatically result in indemnification liability against the 
debtor.”  Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted) 
(citing Combustion Eng’g, 391 F.3d at 226).  Though the 
Bankruptcy Court opined that our holding was “inherently 
conflicting” and did not “make any sense,” JA 863, 874, it 
properly recognized that it is bound by that holding, which we 
reaffirm today.   
 






On appeal, CNA maintains that the Montana Claims 
satisfy both the derivative liability and statutory relationship 
requirements.  While we agree with the former, the record is 
currently insufficient to decide the latter.  We will therefore 
remand to the Bankruptcy Court for the limited purposes of 
developing the record and making an initial determination as 
to whether the statutory relationship requirement is met. 
 
A. Derivative Liability 
 
We begin our analysis where we left off in 2018.  In 
Grace I, the Montana Plaintiffs argued that their claims were 
not derivative because they were based on CNA’s own 
misconduct, and, therefore, did not seek to recover from 
CNA’s insurance policies for Grace’s liabilities.15  CNA 
argued that the claims were derivative because Grace’s 
asbestos was indisputably the “but-for” cause of the Montana 
Plaintiffs’ injuries.16  We rejected both proposed frameworks, 
finding “the former [to be] overly narrow and the latter [to be] 
overly broad.”17   
 
With respect to the Montana Plaintiffs’ argument, we 
noted that while actions for insurance proceeds were surely 
“attempt[s] to hold the insurer ‘directly liable’ for claims 
 
15 Grace I, 900 F.3d at 135-36.   
 






against its insured . . . nothing in the statute’s text supports 
indirect insurer liability only where a claimant seeks to recover 
from insurance proceeds.”18  Moreover, “that a third party is 
alleged to have engaged in some wrongdoing is not enough to 
render a claim against it independent if its liability depends on 
the debtor’s liability.”19   
 
With respect to CNA’s argument, the mere fact “that a 
debtor’s product caused a plaintiff’s injury is not enough to 
render a third party liable ‘for the conduct of, claims against, 
or demands on the debtor’ . . . [because] [s]uch a rule, . . . has 
the potential to include third-party liability that is wholly 
separate from a debtor’s liability.”20  While “[t]he involvement 
of the debtor’s asbestos is relevant, . . . [it] is not dispositive.”21  
We elaborated on this point with the following example: 
 
[T]here may be cases in which the involvement 
of the debtor’s product is only incidental (for 
example, if a piece of building material 
containing Grace asbestos in a CNA office fell 
and struck someone).  There . . . the presence of 
 
18 Id. (emphasis added).   
 
19 Id.  
 
20 Id. at 137. 
 




the debtor’s asbestos would not render the third-
party’s liability derivative.22 
 
As such, we concluded that neither approach comported with 
the requirements of § 524(g).  
 
Instead, we held that, “[t]he proper inquiry is to review 
the law applicable to the claims being raised against the third 
party (and when necessary to interpret state law) to determine 
whether the third-party’s liability is wholly separate from the 
debtor’s liability or instead depends on it.”23  We were clear 
that this approach “does not require the reviewing court to 
decide state-law claims on the merits.  It does, however, require 
it to ascertain what liability under the relevant law demands.”24   
 
22 Id.   
 
23 Id.  
 
24 Id.  Because the Bankruptcy Court had not determined 
whether, under the relevant state law, CNA’s alleged duty to 
Plaintiffs would arise under common law or under the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, we vacated this portion of the 
underlying decision and remanded for it to make this 
determination.  On remand, the Bankruptcy Court instead 
developed its own framework, relying in large part on a line of 
Second Circuit cases—known as the Johns-Manville cases—
which we had distinguished in Grace I.  See id. at 136 n.4.  
Applying this framework, the Bankruptcy Court declined to 
decide whether CNA’s alleged duty to plaintiffs arose under 
Montana common law or the Restatement.  Instead, it found 
that under either, “CNA owes a duty to the plaintiffs which is 
entirely independent of CNA’s contractual duties to Grace 
14 
 
Throughout this litigation, both parties have maintained 
that Montana law applies, and we agree.  To show negligence 
in Montana, the Montana Plaintiffs must show that: (1) CNA 
owed them a legal duty; (2) CNA breached that duty; (3) the 
breach caused the Montana Plaintiffs harm; and (4) they 
suffered damages.25  This case hinges exclusively on the first 
element—CNA’s alleged legal duty to the Montana Plaintiffs. 
   
Under Montana law, there is generally no duty “to 
protect others from risks of harm directly caused or created by 
third parties.”26  However, there are certain exceptions to this 
rule.  One potential exception lies in § 324A of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, which deals with liability to third persons 
other than the intended beneficiary of the undertaking.  Section 
324A states that: 
 
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for 
consideration, to render services to another 
which he should recognize as necessary for the 
protection of a third person or his things, is 
 
under the CNA policies.”  JA 7.  Because the Montana 
Plaintiffs’ right to sue CNA was not based on Grace’s right to 
sue CNA, it concluded that the Montana Claims were not 
derivative.  But in reaching this conclusion, the Bankruptcy 
Court relied on reasoning we had explicitly rejected as 
inconsistent with the statute.  See Grace I, 900 F.3d at 136. 
 
25 Krieg v. Massey, 781 P.2d 277, 278-79 (Mont. 1989). 
 
26 Maryland Cas. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Ct., 460 P.3d 882, 




subject to liability to the third person for physical 
harm resulting from his failure to exercise 
reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if (a) 
his failure to exercise reasonable care increases 
the risk of such harm, or (b) he has undertaken to 
perform a duty owed by the other to the third 
person, or (c) the harm is suffered because of 
reliance of the other or the third person upon the 
undertaking.27 
 
Stated otherwise:  
 
[A] party owes a special duty of care to protect 
others from foreseeable harms caused or created 
by a third party beyond the first party’s control 
if: (1) the first party, gratuitously or for 
consideration, affirmatively undertakes to render 
aid or services to the third party; (2) the first 
party reasonably should recognize that such aid 
or services are necessary under the 
circumstances for the protection of other persons 
or property; and (3) one or more of the following 
special circumstances exist: 
 
(A) the failure of the first party to use reasonable 
care in the performance of the undertaking 








(B) the first party affirmatively assumes the third 
party’s responsibility to perform a 
preexisting legal duty of care owed by the 
third party to the other(s) at issue; or 
 
(C) harm occurs because the other(s), or the third 
party, relied on the first party to competently 
perform the subject undertaking.28 
 
Until recently, it was unclear whether Montana law recognized 
this exception.  However, after the Bankruptcy Decision but 
before briefing in this appeal, the Montana Supreme Court 
adopted § 324A in a similar case brought against another of 
Grace’s insurers, MCC (“Hutt”).29  There, the Court held that 
MCC owed Grace workers an independent duty of care under 
§ 324A based on its “knowledge of conditions and 
circumstances in and about Grace facilities and operations, and 
its own conduct, wholly independent of its independent 
contract duty to Grace, Grace’s independent common law duty 
 
28 Hutt, 460 P.3d at 897 (2020) (citing Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 324A).  The claims in Hutt were not barred by the 
Grace Injunction because they were premised on insurance 
policies not included in Grace’s reorganization plan.  See In re 
W.R. Grace & Co., No. 01-01139 (KG), 2016 WL 6137275, at 
*13-14 (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 17, 2016).  In contrast, in Grace I, 
we held that the claims at issue in this case were covered by 
the Injunction’s terms.  See Grace I, 900 F.3d at 134-35.   
 




to its workers, or any act or omission by either in breach 
thereof.”30 
 
All parties agree that, as in Hutt, any alleged duty CNA 
owed to the Montana Plaintiffs arises under § 324A.  The 
relevant inquiry, then, is whether CNA’s liability pursuant to § 
324A is dependent on Grace’s liability or is instead “wholly 
separate” from it.31  CNA argues that its liability is dependent 
on Grace’s because § 324A only applies if the Montana 
Plaintiffs can show that CNA “render[ed] services” to Grace 
and “should have recognized those services as necessary for 
the protection of [the Montana Plaintiffs].”32  According to the 
Montana Plaintiffs, however, Grace’s “sole role” under § 324A 
is to “provid[e] the context for CNA’s liability to third 
persons,” meaning that Grace’s “role in creating the hazard 
CNA undertook to address is irrelevant.”33  Because CNA may 
still be liable for “circumstances beyond its control,” regardless 
of whether the harm was caused by Grace, the Montana 
Plaintiffs argue that the claims are not derivative because 
“[t]heir legal basis under Montana law does not require that 
Grace be liable in order for CNA to be liable.”34 
 
30 Id. at 907. 
  
31 Grace I, 900 F.3d at 137.   
 
32 CNA Br. at 37 (internal quotation marks and alterations 
omitted) (quoting Hutt, 460 P.3d at 897). 
 
33 Montana Pls. Br. at 25-26.   
 





CNA has the better argument.  Here, as in Hutt, it is 
indisputable that the injuries alleged in the Montana Claims 
were caused by Grace’s actions.  For example, the Montana 
Plaintiffs allege that the Grace mine “generated substantial 
airborne dust containing asbestos,” and that the Montana 
Plaintiffs were ultimately harmed by this asbestos.35  They 
even concede that “Grace was clearly a cause, and arguably 
even a primary cause, of [their] injuries.”36  They argue, 
however, that “what establishes the heightened standard [under 
§ 324A] is not that Grace caused the hazard, just 
‘circumstances beyond [CNA’s] control.’”37  While it may be 
true that, in a different case, “those circumstances happen to 
result from God, . . . another entity, or a butterfly flapping its 
wings in the Amazonian jungle,” here, they result from 
Grace.38  We decline to apply the law with a willful ignorance 
to the facts of this case.   
 
It therefore cannot be that, as the Montana Plaintiffs 
argue, Grace’s only role in a § 324A analysis is to “provid[e] 
the context for CNA’s liability to third persons,”39 or that, more 
generally, duties owed to third parties cannot satisfy the 
 
35 JA 119, 148. 
 




38 Id.  
 




derivative liability requirement.  For a duty to even exist 
under §324A, there must be some “foreseeable risks of harms 
caused or created by a third party beyond the first party’s 
control.”40  And here, if Grace had not “caused or created” at 
least some foreseeable harm through its asbestos operations, 
the Montana Plaintiffs would not have the benefit of § 324A at 
all.  CNA’s liability, then, cannot be “wholly independent” of 
Grace’s.  To the contrary, the Montana Plaintiffs cannot make 
out a case under § 324A without directly implicating Grace’s 
wrongdoing.41   
 
Because they rely on § 324A, which in turn, only applies 
in this case because of Grace’s risk-creating conduct, the 
Montana Claims depend on Grace’s wrongdoing and therefore 
meet the derivative liability requirement.  
 
 
40 Hutt, 460 P.3d at 897. 
 
41 The Montana Plaintiffs’ argument that our decision 
necessarily creates a “but-for” causation requirement—which 
we disavowed in Grace I—is unavailing.  There are many 
situations where Grace’s asbestos may cause injury that would 
not trigger a duty under § 324A.  One need look no further than 
our decision in Grace I, in which we described an example of 
a piece of Grace’s asbestos falling on someone on CNA’s 
premises.  While the asbestos would no doubt be the “but-for” 
cause of any claims against CNA in that scenario, CNA’s duty 
would not arise under § 324A and would therefore likely be 
non-derivative.  Here, however, it is not merely the case that 
the Montana Plaintiffs’ injuries were caused by Grace’s 




B. Statutory Relationship   
 
We next turn to § 524(g)’s statutory relationship 
requirement.  In considering this requirement, Grace I directed 
the Bankruptcy Court to “examine the elements necessary to 
make the Montana Claims under the applicable law (here, state 
law), and determine whether CNA’s provision of insurance to 
Grace is relevant legally to those elements.”42  The Bankruptcy 
Court interpreted this guidance as imposing a legal elements 
test and found that this requirement was not satisfied because 
“none of the [tort] elements reference insurance at all.”43  
Instead, it reasoned that “liability is imposed on a third party, 
under certain circumstances, when the third party renders 
services to another,” but these services need not be insurance-
related.44  The Bankruptcy Court therefore concluded that 
“CNA’s provision of insurance to Grace has no relevance to 
CNA’s alleged liability to the Montana Plaintiffs under either 
the Restatement or the Common Law Standards.”45  
  
We disagree with this interpretation.  Here, it is clear 
from the complaint that CNA did provide some services to 
Grace, including, as is most relevant here, inspecting the Libby 
mine and providing industrial hygiene services to its workers.  
That the legal elements of the relevant state law torts do not 
 
42 Grace I, 900 F.3d at 138.    
 
43 JA 57.   
 
44 Id.   
 




require these services to be insurance-related is irrelevant to 
the analysis at hand.  Instead, the appropriate question is 
whether the Montana Plaintiffs have made a prima facie case 
that CNA’s provision of insurance was legally relevant to its 
allegedly negligent undertaking of industrial hygiene and 
medical monitoring services.  Or, put another way, whether 
they have shown that the services allegedly provided by CNA 
were incidental to its provision of insurance.   
 
CNA urges that we answer this question in the 
affirmative.  It directs us back to § 324A, under which “an 
undertaking to provide services to another is a threshold 
requirement to establish a legal duty to protect,”46 and argues 
that, because its alleged undertakings arose solely due to its 
insurance relationship with Grace, its provision of insurance is 
therefore legally relevant for purposes of the statutory 
relationship inquiry.  But that would be true only if Montana 
law took into consideration the basis (here, the provision of 
insurance) for the alleged undertaking.  Instead, it requires only 
that CNA, “affirmatively undertakes to render aid or services 
to the third party” and that it “should recognize that such aid or 
services are necessary under the circumstances for the 
protection of other persons.”47  In other words, § 324A is 
unconcerned with why CNA undertook to render services; only 
that it did so.  Thus, while the insurance relationship is a but-
 
46 CNA Br. at 48.   
 




for cause of CNA’s undertaking, it is not necessarily legally 
relevant to it.48   
 
CNA also draws our attention to a footnote in Grace 
I where we stated that a “‘legal consequence’ connection” 
exists where an insurer’s “alleged duty . . . derives directly 
from its provision of insurance.”49  In that footnote, we merely 
sought to explain that although CNA had styled its argument 
as calling for a “but-for” causation requirement, it had actually 
described and advocated for a “legal consequence” connection.  
We did not mean to suggest—as CNA argues—that the 
presence of an insurance relationship alone is sufficient to meet 
the statutory relationship requirement.  Accepting CNA’s 
approach would collapse the derivative and statutory 
relationship inquiries.  This result is overbroad and would 
potentially encompass even claims like those at issue in Hutt, 
which alleged that the insurer went far above and beyond its 
insurance relationship and therefore assumed independent 
 
48 This is consistent with the Second Circuit’s conclusion in In 
re Quigley, which we explicitly stated “comports” with our 
framework.  Grace I, 900 F.3d at 137 n.7.  There, the Court 
held that although Pfizer’s ownership of the debtor was the 
reason why it had branded the debtor’s products as its own, 
only the branding—not the reason for it—was legally relevant 
to establishing apparent-manufacturer liability under 
Restatement § 400.  See 676 F.3d at 62.  
 




duties to the Grace workers.50  Again, we decline to adopt such 
a categorical approach to § 524(g).   
 
But we are similarly unpersuaded by the Montana 
Plaintiffs’ argument that these services cannot be incidental to 
the “provision of insurance” because “Montana law does not 
recognize a claim against an insurer based solely on 
inspections and risk-management services an insurer might 
customarily supply incident to its insurance policy.”51  As we 
have previously noted, our analysis does not require us “to 
decide state-law claims on the merits,”52 and so the potential 
viability of the Montana Claims is irrelevant. 
 
The problem for this Court, however, is that we cannot, 
on the record before us, say whether the services allegedly 
provided by CNA were within the scope of its provision of 
insurance to Grace because we have little to no information 
about what providing that kind of insurance entailed in the 
context of this particular insurance policy as interpreted under 
Montana law.  In spite of CNA’s urging, we have no evidence 
that “[i]nspections and loss-control recommendations are 
[generally] central to insurance underwriting and risk 
management.”  Nor do we know that inspections and 
 
50 Because these particular claims are not before us, we express 
no opinion as to whether, under different circumstances, they 
would be barred by § 524(g)’s channeling injunction.  We only 
leave open the possibility that this might be the case.   
 
51 Montana Pls. Br. at 48-49.    
  




industrial-hygiene services of the type alleged “were standard 
insurance-related services.”53  More importantly, even if we 
did, the record here reflects nothing about whether such 
services were within the scope of the provision of insurance in 
this case,54 and the policy itself indicates only that “[CNA] . . . 
shall . . . be permitted but not obligated to inspect at any 
reasonable time the workplaces, operations, machinery and 
equipment covered by this policy.”55  As the Montana Plaintiffs 
rightly point out, “[t]he statute refers to ‘provision of 
insurance,’ not ‘provision of whatever services insurers 
customarily provide.’”56   
 
We therefore remand to the Bankruptcy Court for the 
limited purpose of making factual findings as to what services 
were included in CNA’s provision of insurance to Grace, and 
whether the Montana Plaintiffs have made a prima facie 
showing under Montana law that CNA provided services 
beyond these.  If that is the case, then the Montana Claims do 
not meet the statutory relationship requirement; if not, 
 
53 Montana Pls. Br. at 51. 
 
54 We do not mean to suggest that industry practice can never 
be dispositive in this context, only that, based on the 
allegations before us, we do not know the role that it played 
here.  The role of this evidence will necessarily differ based on 
the individual facts of each case.   
 
55 900 F.3d at 131 (citation omitted). 
 




however, then the claims at issue meet all of the requirements 




For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the decision below 
and remand to the Bankruptcy Court for further proceedings in 
accordance with this Opinion.  This panel will retain 
jurisdiction over any future appeals.    
